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In modern publicly traded corporations, the 
commitment of directors is not restricted to only 
one firm, and corporate directors can hold multiple 
directorships simultaneously (Jackling and Johl, 
2009). Nonetheless, it is important to investigate 
how many directorships corporate directors can 
hold, because, if no limits are placed on multiple 
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The purpose of the paper is to investigate, first, the association 
between multiple directorship assignments (busyness) undertaken 
by corporate directors and firm performance, second, whether 
endogenously determined limits of multiple directorships, 
highlighting the ownership structure and other institutional 
settings, explain the above association better than those by 
exogenously mandated by regulators and third, the association 
between the nature of busyness and firm performance. The study 
develops measures of busyness in the light of the agency and 
resource dependence theories. The spline regression technique is 
applied in order to reflect institutional settings of a large sample 
and sub-samples of firms classified as local private, foreign and 
government firms in India. For local private firms, the association 
between the number of directorships and firm performance 
becomes negative before reaching the maximum number of 
directorships set by legislation, whereas, for foreign and 
government firms, the same continues to remain positive 
throughout. Endogenously determined cut-off points of busyness 
reflect institutional settings of firms, which may remain masked 
otherwise. The findings of the current paper can be useful to study 
the same phenomenon in other emerging markets having 
corporate governance, and ownership structures similar to that of 
India. The effect of busyness can be different on different firms; 
however, exogenously fixed regulatory limits do not reflect their 
institutional settings. The current paper is an attempt to fill in this 
research gap. 
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directorship assignments accepted by directors of a 
firm in other firms then as a result such directors 
can become too busy, and their busyness can 
adversely affect firm performance (Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Council 
of Institutional Investors, 2013; Aguilera and Crespi-
Cladera, 2016).  
The principal objectives of the current paper 
are to examine, first, how the busyness of directors 
impacts firm performance in India in the light of the 
two alternative theoretical perspectives, that is, 
agency theory and resource dependence theory, and 
second, to what extent the relationship between 
busyness of directors and firm performance hold 
endogenously. For example, promoters’18 ownership, 
and control underline important characteristics of 
firms in India and exogenously determined 
regulatory busyness limits may not incorporate such 
characteristics. The third objective of the current 
paper is to study how the intensity of busyness is 
associated with the firm performance, that is when a 
director of a firm accepts a certain number of 
multiple directorships in other firms as member of 
specialized committees, for example, audit 
committee, compensation committee and 
nominating committee, then the amount and nature 
of work he/she is expected to do are relatively 
demanding in comparison to a situation when such 
director joins only general board of directors of the 
same number of firms, other things being equal.    
Using the unbalanced panel data of 3733 firm-
years between 2004-12 of non-financial listed firms 
in India and applying multivariate spline regression 
method, the findings reveal that for local private 
firms, the negative association between the number 
of directorships and firm performance starts long 
before the maximum limit of directorships 
prescribed by regulators is reached, whereas, for the 
foreign and government firms, the positive 
association between the two continues even when 
the limit of maximum busyness is reached. Similarly, 
promoters’ ownership and control affect the firm 
performance of firms belonging to local private, 
foreign and government sectors differently. 
However, except for the foreign firms, the negative 
effect of the intensity of busyness on firm 
performance starts before the maximum permissible 
limit of multiple directorships.                    
The current paper contributes to the body of 
literature in a variety of ways. First, the current 
paper applies endogenously determined limits to 
multiple directorships for the full sample and sub-
samples categorised based on ownership structure, 
therefore, questions the validity of exogenously 
determined regulatory limits. Second, the current 
paper analyzing the association between multiple 
directorships and firm performance is one of the 
few studies in the settings of an emerging economy, 
such as India as most of the similar studies have 
been carried out in the US and similar settings (Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris et al., 2003). Third, the 
                                                          
18 According to the section 69 of the Companies Act of India (MCA 2013), a 
promoter is a person “…who has control over the affairs of the company, 
directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, director or otherwise…” 
(p.9). More than 40 percent of sample firms in India have at-least one 
promoter director on the board, and promoter directors also chair the board 
of directors of more than 30 percent of firms (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000).       
current paper also explores the effects of promoters’ 
ownership and control, a peculiar and prevalent 
feature of Indian corporate settings, on firm 
performance. The current study makes two 
theoretical contributions too (Basu and Sen, 2015). 
First, in the current study relatively ‘visible’ concept 
of board independence, often measured by the 
proportion of independent directors on the board 
(e.g. Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011) is 
substituted by the busyness of corporate directors, 
which is one of the determinants of independence of 
boards. Second, the current paper contributes a new 
concept of intensity of busyness, which defines 
busyness from the rigor, and responsibility 
requirements of various functions performed by 
corporate directors, which is different from a mere 
number of directorships they hold.       
The remainder of the paper is divided into the 
following sections: Section 2 highlights the 
background of multiple directorships and the 
corporate governance system in India. Section 3 
highlights theoretical background, literature review 
and hypotheses development. Sections 4 addresses 
various aspects related to research design, whereas 
Section 5 presents results and discussion based 
thereon. Section 6 is about conclusions, limitations 
and future research suggestions.   
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The Indian corporate governance system is a hybrid 
in nature as it incorporates characteristics of two 
different dimensions of corporate governance, 
namely the vertical dimension, also known as the 
outside, Anglo-Saxon and market-based governance 
system (Roe, 2004); and the horizontal dimension, 
also known as the inside, European and bank-based 
governance system (Roe, 2004). Many researchers 
have given the following arguments in support of 
their claim that the Indian corporate governance 
system is similar to the vertical dimension of 
corporate governance. First, India has the largest 
number of listed companies in the world, second, 
the participation level of small investors in India is 
not as insignificant as in other emerging economies, 
third, the stock markets in India are very active and 
relatively developed, and fourth, the takeover 
market is very active, even when compared with 
developed economies like Germany and Japan (e.g. 
Shaun, 2007; Dutta, 1997; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012). 
Furthermore, Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) also draw 
several parallels between the Indian governance 
system and the horizontal dimension of corporate 
governance by giving the following arguments. First, 
ownership concentration in India is highly skewed in 
favour of promoters, second, the proportion of 
widely held companies is lower when compared with 
other emerging economies in East Asia, and Europe, 
and third, financial institutions play an important 
role as a source of external finance (both debt and 
equity). 
A significant feature of the corporate 
governance system in India is that the ownership 
and control structure of firms are highly skewed in 
favour of promoter-owners (promoter, hereafter). 
Promoters include individuals, families, firms, and 
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government bodies. A significant feature of 
promoter-dominated corporate ownership structure 
is that it strives to maximise their control over a 
firm for a given level of ownership (Aguilera and 
Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Chakrabarti et al., 2008; Sarkar 
and Sarkar, 2000). Promoters can enhance their 
control disproportionately of their ownership by the 
following two ways (Basu and Sen, 2015). First, by 
appointing those directors in the firm X, who are 
either serving on boards of other firms within the 
business group that the firm X is also affiliated with. 
Second, by appointing those directors in the firm X, 
who although are not belonging to the same 
business group, however, belonging to firms having 
strong business linkages with the firm X. The high 
level of ownership concentration and promoters 
dominance pave the way for the phenomena of 
pyramiding and tunnelling19 as well as earnings 
management (Mathew, 2007; Chakrabarti et al., 
2008; Hundal, 2016).  
The phenomenon of multiple directorships in 
India can be attributed to supply constraints in the 
market of corporate directors that started soon after 
1947 when India became an independent nation. 
Due to the paucity of experienced, qualified, and 
reputed corporate leadership in a newly independent 
nation, firms started approaching relatively 
successful and experienced directors to join their 
boards and it was soon not uncommon to find some 
directors on more than 50 corporate boards (Mehta, 
1955). However, the section 275 of the Companies 
Act of India (MCA, 1956) was the first step to specify 
a maximum number of directorships to fifteen, later 
on increased to twenty that corporate directors 
could hold in publicly traded firms. The Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), (an equivalent to 
the SEC in the USA) in its guidelines, known as the 
Clause 49, recommended that no director would 
become a member of ten boards or serve as the 
chairperson of more than five committees across all 
firms. Nevertheless, because the legislation did not 
include private firms, unlimited companies, and non-
profit organisations (except subsidiaries or holding 
companies of a publicly traded firm), the Companies 
Act of India paved the way for the actual number of 
multiple directorships to easily exceed the 
regulatory limit. In addition, the imposed limit was 
purely exogenous, as it was adjusted in relation to 
the average level of multiple directorships in the 
USA and the UK, therefore, ignoring the differences 
in institutional settings of firms (Bhabha, 1952).  
Ever since the economic reforms initiated in the 
early 1990s in India, there has been a major shift in 
the corporate ownership structure from the 
dominance of public sector to the private sector, 
including both local Indian and foreign firms 
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 2003). Above-
mentioned developments have necessitated major 
                                                          
19 Pyramiding is a common practice in India, and other Asian countries and 
is used to create a top-down chain of control over multiple firms through an 
ownership structure, which allows more control over a firm for a given level 
of ownership in it. Tunneling can be defined as the act of transferring assets 
and profits out of firms by the controlling shareholders for their own 
benefit. Tunneling encompasses the sale of the firm’s assets, transfer pricing 
advantageous to the controlling shareholder, excessive executive 
compensation, loan guarantees, insider trading etc. (See La Porta et al., 
1999). 
changes in the corporate governance system of India 
including multiple directorships. According to the 
section 165(1) of the Companies Act of India (MCA, 
2013: 97) “No person, after the commencement of 
this Act, shall hold office as a director, including any 
alternate directorship, in more than twenty 
companies at the same time: Provided that the 
maximum number of public companies in which a 
person can be appointed as a director shall not 
exceed ten”.  
A major limitation of the corporate governance 
system in India is that several regulatory provisions 
are in conflict with each other. For example, the 
Companies Act of India (2013) specifies maximum 
limit of busyness to ten (MCA, 2013), whereas the 
revised clause 49 restricts the same to seven with 
effect from 2014 (Ernst & Young, 2014). 
 
͵Ǥ  
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

 
The current paper derives its theoretical 
underpinnings from two well known, albeit mutually 
conflicting theories- the agency theory, and the 
resource dependence theory. According to agency 
theory, one of the principal functions of corporate 
boards is to function independently and detect and 
deter discretionary managerial actions through a 
system of monitoring, and control on behalf of 
investors and other stakeholders of firms 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A key argument made in this 
paper is that the independence of corporate 
directors is influenced by the busyness of boards, 
among other things. Ferris et al. (2003) have 
developed the busyness hypothesis that postulates 
that as their number of directorships increases, 
corporate directors become over-committed. 
According to the agency theory, the busyness of 
corporate directors adversely affects firm 
performance (Méndez et al., 2015).       
The negative impacts of busyness are valid for 
both inside and outside directors. For inside 
directors of a firm, their busyness in other firms 
may cause decline in the required time and attention 
necessary to perform their various day-to-day 
managerial tasks, formulation/revision of plans, risk 
management and strategy assessment (Dalton et al., 
2003); second, as their experience and knowledge 
are more about firm-specific operational activities, 
therefore, inside directors are not essentially good 
monitors of managerial actions in other firms (Klein, 
1998); third, they are willing to (or asked to) take up 
multiple outside directorships in other firms within 
the corporate group as a mechanism to strengthen 
control of promoters, and large shareholders, which 
can result in the exploitation of minority 
shareholders (Dutta, 1997). Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) 
find that stock market reaction becomes adverse as 
the level of busyness of inside directors increases.  
Similarly, when outside directors of a given 
firm become over-committed by accepting multiple 
directorships in other firms, the following harmful 
effects can arise. First, the ability of outside 
directors to effectively monitor managerial actions 
of the firm reduces as the busyness of outside 
directors increases (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Tanyi 
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and Smith, 2015); second, outside directors can 
experience a conflict of interests and trigger the 
distrust of other firms, especially when these 
directors are also serving on the boards of 
competitors, and this can result in firms 
experiencing undue delays in decision making (Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006); third, outside directors can 
be perceived to be following perquisite consumption 
behavior (seeking financial and non-financial 
benefits) and not performing genuine monitoring of 
managerial actions (Dutta, 1997; Mathew, 2007); 
fourth, busy outside directors may find it difficult to 
understand the nature of operations, managerial 
actions, vision and mission, control mechanisms, 
and various board dynamics and related challenges 
of their affiliated firms (Kisgen et al., 2009); and 
fifth not only similar to inside directors but also 
very common in Indian corporate system, outside 
directors may accept multiple directorships in order 
to enhance control of promoters over firms within a 
group (Chakrabarti et al., 2008; Chen et al, 2014).  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) advocate regulatory 
limits on multiple directorships in order to check 
the erosion of a firm’s value, and they find that 
multiple outside board directorships start affecting 
firm performance adversely, however, only when the 
majority of directors hold three or more board 
positions, therefore, the phenomenon of busyness 
and its effects on firm performance should be 
understood in reference to busyness of overall board 
and not in the context of an individual director. 
Based on the findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
it may be interpreted that, first, the incremental 
impact of additional directorships on firm value is 
not constant and second, regulators should 
prescribe some limits on additional directorships 
that corporate directors can hold; however, such 
limits must incorporate the institutional settings in 
which firms operate, for example, ownership 
structure, firm size, nature of the business, board 
composition etc. 
The second underlying theory in the current 
paper is resource dependence theory (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a, b; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). A firm appointing board-level 
directors, who also serve on other corporate boards, 
adds to its resources in the form of both, human 
capital (education, experience, expertise, skills) and 
relational capital ( a network of ties to other firms, 
external environment and external contingencies). In 
the current paper, the combination of the human 
and relational capital of directors is defined as 
reputational capital (Hundal, 2016). Firms operating 
in a relatively uncertain business environment can 
be benefitted by recruiting those directors, who not 
only have a higher level of human capital but also a 
well-developed relational capital network with other 
organisations and external contingencies. Similarly, 
large firms with complex business operations and 
organisational structures require board members 
with diverse skills, knowledge, and experience, to 
bolster decision making (Booth and Deli, 1996; Ferris 
and Jagannathan, 2001; Barzuza and Quinn, 2017). 
The directors serving on multiple boards fulfil the 
above criteria; therefore, firms recruiting such 
directors can do better strategic decision-making 
amidst a high level of uncertainty (Pearce and Zahra, 
1992). Similarly, multiple directorships accepted by 
directors also signify their reputational capital in the 
market for corporate directors, which can be an 
important motivation for other directors to accept 
outside directorships (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Ferris et al. (2003) find that busy directors attend 
meetings regularly in order to consolidate their 
reputational capital, which results in increased 
managerial accountability, and better guidance 
provided to firms. Further, directors, who serve on 
multiple boards, promote several healthy practices 
among firms they are affiliated to, for example, 
exchange of skills, knowledge, and experiences and 
enhanced co-operation, and business relationships 
(Becher et al. 2016). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
provide empirical evidence that directors affiliated 
to firms giving an outstanding accounting and stock 
market performance are regarded as successful 
directors, and their demand in the market for 
corporate directors is high. Conversely, directors on 
boards of firms giving a poor accounting and stock 
market performance are less likely to be invited to 
the boards of other firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983).    
When a firm struggling with impending 
bankruptcy invites directors, who already hold 
directorships in other firms, it can not only thwart 
looming bankruptcy situations but also implement a 
restructuring process effectively by capitalising 
reputational capital of its well-connected directors 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Kaplan and Sorensen 
2016). The firm’s response to capitalise the 
reputational capital of directors serving on multiple 
corporate boards to combat an actual/potential 
financial distress situation can be either reactive (ex-
post) or proactive (ex-ante). The above finding of 
Daily and Dalton emphasises the former; however, 
firms can also invite such directors on their boards 
proactively in order to minimise the likelihood of 
such existential threats in the first place. To support 
the latter argument, Daily and Dalton (1994b) argue 
that a firm with directors connected to the external 
environment, especially those serving on the boards 
of financial institutions, is better positioned to face 
future financial challenges, as such directors can 
play an important role in arranging the right type of 
financial resources and on favorable terms. In a 
similar vein, Ferris and Jagannathan (2001) find that 
the multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors symbolize their reputational capital 
accumulated over time, and firms experience 
improvements in their operating profits and return 
on equity after they appoint such reputed directors 
on their boards. The phenomenon of multiple 
directorships increases trust and friendship between 
the independent directors and firm management 
and help decision making the power of boards 
(Harris and Shimizu, 2004).   
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that board 
capital, specifically, adds to the following four types 
of benefits to firms:  
1) Advice and Counsel: Professionals such as 
lawyers, accountants, senior managers of other 
firms, former government officials, and community 
leaders serving on a corporate board contribute 
valuable expertise, experience, and skills to its 
executives (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Gales and 
Kesner, 1994).  
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2) Legitimacy: A firm’s reputation can be 
affected by the reputation of those serving on its 
board of directors. The high level of reputational 
capital of directors confers legitimacy to actions of 
the firm (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al., 1999).    
3) Communication Channels: A firm having 
effective channels of communication with external 
organisations helps it in obtaining timely and 
valuable information, which further helps in 
minimizing transaction costs that the firm incurs 
while operating in an uncertain business 
environment. The high quality of relational capital at 
board level facilitates such channels of 
communication and the flow of information. Hillman 
et al. (1999) showed that when directors established 
connections with the U.S. government or financial 
institutions, the shareholders’ value increases. 
Similarly, the interlocking of directorates also plays 
an important role in disseminating information 
within firms (Barzuza and Quinn, 2017; Wu, 2017; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Au et al., 2000).    
4) Resources Mobilisation: A combined effect of 
the above three points is that board capital can be 
helpful in acquiring resources from external 
organisations (e.g., financial markets), and 
stakeholder groups (e.g., customers, suppliers, and 
communities). 
Based on literature pertaining to various 
theoretical underpinnings, regulatory developments 
and prior empirical findings, the followings two 
hypotheses are formed: 
H
1
. Multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors negatively affect firm performance (agency 
theory). 
H
2
. Multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors positively affect firm performance (resource 
dependency theory). 
Mehta (1955) finds that during the early phase 
of industrialisation in India local private 
entrepreneurs experienced a shortage of leadership 
and guidance, and the practice of multiple 
directorships provided a solution to this problem to 
some extent. Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016) find 
that remuneration attributed to board and CEO 
characteristics in both private and public sectors 
does not influence firm performance. Dutta (1997) 
recommends to place a maximum limit on directors’ 
busyness as many directors, who take up multiple 
directorships in other firms, may have the 
motivation to enhance their personal utility, for 
example, to earn extra income and develop their 
personal network in the market of corporate 
directors. Similarly, Jackling and Johl (2009) and 
Hundal (2016) find that increased busyness of board 
of directors in the Indian private firms results in the 
lower monitoring of managerial actions, which 
further results in poor firm performance and 
deterioration in the quality of financial reporting.  
H
1a
. Multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors of local private firms negatively affect firm 
performance (agency theory). 
Regarding the role of government firms, Ahuja 
and Majumdar (1998) find that government-owned 
firms in India have better corporate governance 
standards because such firms due to their larger 
size are exposed to a high level of regulatory 
monitoring, requiring more disclosures and 
attracting high-quality human resources. On the 
other hand, Chibber and Majumdar (1998) find a 
negative relationship between the government 
ownership and firm performance. Kang and Zhang 
(2015) find that government directors holding 
multiple directorships are more likely to abstain 
from board meetings, especially when they have 
good relations with the CEO or are serving on boards 
of less regulated firms.  
H
1b
. Multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors of government firms negatively affect firm 
performance (agency theory). 
Ananchotikul (2007) views that foreign 
directors and ownership are considered as 
important catalysts by the recipient firms in 
upgrading their technologies, skills, and practices 
that in turn positively affect their performance. It 
may be argued that the phenomenon of multiple 
directorships positively impacts firm performance. 
In the Indian context, Patibandla (2006) and Hundal 
(2016) find that foreign ownership favourably 
affects firm value, however, Chibber and Majumdar 
(1999) hold that such favourable effect exists only 
when foreign ownership is relatively high.  
H
2a
. Multiple directorships held by corporate 
directors of foreign firms positively affect firm 
performance (resource dependency theory). 
The intensity of busyness can be harmful to the 
firm performance. The level of responsibilities and 
skills requirements is relatively higher in the case of 
specialised committees such as audit, compensation, 
and nomination. Liao and Hsu (2013) find that cash 
remuneration paid to a CEO is decoupled from 
firm’s performance when there is the higher 
intensity of busyness. Contrary to this, Ferris et al. 
(2003) find that intensity of busyness affects the 
firm performance favourably in the form of 
increased managerial accountability as directors 
serving on multiple committees attend meetings 
regularly. However, Ferris et al. (2003) do not rule 
out the possibility of enhanced compensation as a 
motivation to join multiple committee memberships.  
H
3
. The intensity of busyness unfavorably affects 
firm performance. 
 
ͶǤ

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The data of the final sample is comprised of an 
unbalanced panel of 3733 firm-years of non-
financial firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and National Stock Exchange (NSE) over the 
period of 2004-12. The full sample is further divided 
into three sub-samples of non-financial firms 
categorised on the basis of their ownership structure 
including 2376 local private, 772 government, and 
585 foreign20 firm-years. The rationale of 
categorizing firms in three sub-samples is that even 
though the economic reforms initiated in the early 
1990s in India, have resulted in a major shift in the 
corporate ownership structure, away from the public 
sector and towards the private sector, including 
local Indian and foreign firms, however, the 
                                                          
20 Foreign firms also include those established by Indian expatriates known 
as the Non-resident Indians (NRIs). 
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government-owned firms still play a highly 
significant role on corporate spectrum of India 
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 2003). The 
local private sector firms analysed in the current 
paper are group-affiliated. In terms of number, 
group-affiliated firms constitute 40 percent of 
standalone firms, in the private sector in India. 
However, group-affiliated firms are approximately 
six times larger than standalone firms in terms of 
asset base, and seven times in terms of market 
capitalization (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012). For this 
reason, the sub-sample of local Indian firms include 
the group-affiliated private sector firms only. 
Similarly, foreign firms have already established 
their perceptible presence in the Indian corporate 
landscape and it is getting even stronger, thanks to 
economic reforms initiated in the early 1990s 
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012). Therefore, the third sub-
sample comprises of foreign firms. The data has 
been obtained from the Prowess database of the 
Center for Monitoring the Indian economy (CMIE). 
 
ͶǤʹǤ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The definitions and measurement issues related to 
multivariate model, dependent, and independent 
variables are discussed below- 
 
ͶǤʹǤͳǤ
 
The spline or piecewise regression technique is used 
to analyse the relation between two variables that 
allows the slope of the relation to change at specific 
points known as spline knots/nodes/cut-off points 
(Ahlberg et al., 1967; De Boor, 2001). In the context 
of the current paper, the spline regression technique 
can show the effect of different levels of busyness 
on firm performance, favourably (the resource 
dependence argument) or unfavorably (the agency 
theory argument). This technique overcomes the 
limitation of using the exogenously determined cut-
off point of busyness and therefore reflect 
institutional settings of firms. The node at which the 
relation between firm performance and multiple 
directorships turns negative can then be identified 
as the level of board busyness that starts affecting 
firm performance adversely (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Campbell et al., 2015).  
 
ͶǤʹǤʹǤ
 
Tobin-Q (TQ) is defined as the ratio of the sum of 
the market value of equity and debt, to the 
replacement cost of assets. However, in India, as in 
many other developing countries, the calculation of 
TQ is difficult primarily because a large proportion 
of the corporate debt is institutional debt that is not 
actively traded in the debt market. Following several 
existing studies, such as Khanna and Palepu (2001), 
and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), a proxy for TQ is used 
in this paper, which is calculated by taking the book 
value of debt, and the book value of assets in place 
of market values. The TQ is influenced by a firm’s 
growth opportunities. This effect is controlled by 
including expenditure on Research and Development 
(R&D), and advertising as explanatory variables in 
the multivariate model. In order to test the 
robustness of performance variable various other 
performance variables are also included in the 
empirical analysis and these include: Market-to-
book-value ratio (MBVR), Net value added to asset 
ratio (NVAAR) and Return on assets (ROA) 
 
ͶǤʹǤ͵Ǥ
 
Busyness is measured as the board-level median of 
total directorships (number of the board plus 
committee memberships) that is hereafter referred 
to as median directorships, showing the number of 
outside directorships held by the majority, that is, 
fifty percent of the board. Busyness is measured in 
relation to the firm board, and not in relation to 
directors, as ‘directors do not govern, boards do’ (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2006). Spline nodes range between 
three and ten directorships taken up by directors. 
The range starts with ‘three’ directorships as the 
majority of empirical studies in the USA, and even in 
non-US settings, take three directorships as a 
measure of busyness. However, three directorships 
may well be too many in the USA but may not 
necessarily be excessive in India, due to the size (on 
the average US firm are bigger than those in India), 
and complexity (e.g., the US firms have more joint 
ventures/technical collaborations/wholly owned 
subsidiaries abroad than Indian firms). The range 
ends with ten as this is the maximum number of 
directorships that a corporate director can take up 
according to section 165(1) of the Companies Act of 
India (MCA, 2013).    
If ‘y’ is the firm performance (dependent 
variable), and ‘x’ is a busyness measure (independent 
variable), and their relation is estimated by the 
spline linear regression method at the node, say x
1
. 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) in their study have 
formulated two spline variables (spline 1 and spline 
2) as below: 
 
Spline-1 = x, if x < x
1 
= x
1
,
 
if x ≥ x
1 
Spline-2 = 0, if x < x
1 
= (x-x
1
),
 
if x ≥ x
1 
 
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
technique is applied to estimate the following 
functional relationship of the model: 
 
(Performance Variable)
it
= α
 it
 + β
1
(Spline-1)
 it
 + β
2
(Spline-2)
 it
 + β
3
(Comm-BS)
 it
 + β
4
(BS)
 it
 + β
5
(Pr-Ind-Dir)
 it
 + 
β
6
(Pr-Prom-Dir)
 it
 + β
7
(Pr-Prom-Own)
 it
 + β
8
(Pr-Forgn-Own)
 it
 + β
9
(D/E)
 it
 + β
10
(NAS Ratio)
 it
 + β
11
(R&D-
intensity)
 it
 + β
12
(Advert-intensity)
 it
 + β
13
(Trd-intensity)
 it
 + β
14
(MarCap)
 it
 + error
 
term 
(1) 
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Table 1. Description of variables 
 
Variables Label Definition Hypotheses 
Predicted 
Effect 
A. Dependent Variables 
Tobin-Q proxy TQ 
Sum of market value of equity plus book value 
of debt, divided by book value of assets. 
  
Market-to-book-value ratio MBVR 
Firm’s market capitalization divided by its 
book value. 
  
Net value added to asset 
ratio (NVAAR) 
NVAAR 
Net value added of firm scaled by book value 
of its assets 
  
Return on assets ROA 
Net income of a firm divided by book value of 
its assets 
  
B. Independent Variables 
Busyness Variables: 
Spline 1 Directorships Spline-1 
A negative coefficient at a given node implies 
firm performance is adversely affected at that 
level  of firm-level median directorships 
(agency theory). 
H
1
, H
1a
 and H
1b
 - 
Spline 2 Directorships Spline-2 
A positive coefficient at a given node implies 
firm performance is favorably affected at that 
level of firm-level median directorships 
(resource dependence theory). 
H
2
 and H
2a
 + 
Median Committee to 
Board Size 
Comm-BS 
Intensity of busyness is derived by dividing 
firm-level median committee directorships by 
the board size. 
H
3
 - 
Promoters’ ownership, and control variables: 
Promoter directors’ 
proportion 
Pr-Prom-Dir 
Ratio of the number of promoter directors to 
the board size of a firm. This variable 
underlines promoters’ control 
H
1c
 and H
2b
 ± 
Promoters’ ownership 
proportion 
Pr-Prom-
Own 
Ratio of the number of promoter owned 
equity shares to the total number of equity 
shares issued 
H
1d
 and H
2c
 ± 
Other corporate governance variables: 
Board size BS 
Number of board members of a firm (log 
values) 
 + 
Independent directors’ 
proportion 
Pr-Ind-Dir 
Ratio of the number of independent directors 
to the board size of a firm 
 + 
Foreign ownership 
proportion 
Pr-Forgn-
Own 
Ratio of the number of equity shares owned 
by foreign investors to the total number of 
equity shares issued 
 + 
Debt-equity ratio D/E 
Capital structure of firm calculated by 
dividing debt by equity (both book values) 
 ± 
Firm-Level control variables: 
Research and development 
intensity 
R&D-
intensity 
Ratio of the firm-level R&D expenditure to the 
sales revenue 
 + 
Advertisement intensity 
Advert-
intensity 
Ration of the firm-level expenditure on 
advertising to the sales revenue 
 + 
Trade intensity 
Trd-
intensity 
Ratio of the number of shares traded to the 
total number of shares outstanding 
 + 
Market-capitalization MarCap 
Multiplying the market value of a share and 
the number of shares outstanding (log values) 
 + 
 ͷǤ
 
Table 2 depicts the mean values of firm performance 
(dependent variable), and independent variables 
categorised as busyness, corporate governance, and 
some firm-level control variables. Regarding the 
busyness variables, Table 2 shows that the mean 
numbers of total directorships (board memberships 
plus committee memberships) per firm are 79.35, 
78.86 and 67.36 for local private, foreign and 
government firms respectively. The value of the 
same statistic for the full sample is 75.62. 
Furthermore, foreign firms have the highest (lowest) 
percentage of outside (inside) directors, whereas 
local private firms have the highest (lowest) 
percentage of inside (outside) directors. 
Government-owned firms have the largest board size 
(12.78) followed by local private (12.18) and foreign 
firms (10.64). With regard to the composition of 
boards of directors, results show that foreign firms 
have the highest percentage of independent/outside 
directors, followed by government and local private 
firms. Regarding the ownership structure, the 
results show that ownership concentration is highest 
among the foreign firms, as promoters and their 
group ownership is 69.99 percent, whereas, for the 
local private firms, ownership is relatively dispersed. 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation 
highlighting the association between all variables 
used in the analysis of this paper including, 
performance variables, that is TQ (Y1), MBVR (Y2), 
ROA (Y3) and NVAAR (Y4) and busyness, promoter 
ownership and control, corporate governance, and 
firm-level control variables (independent variables, 
X1 to X14). With reference to the independent 
variables, except for the correlation coefficients of 
promoter directors’ proportion (X4) with promoters’ 
ownership proportion (X5), and independent 
directors’ proportion (X6), both with a 10 percent 
level of significance, no other pairwise coefficient 
correlation is significant. Therefore, the empirical 
results are not affected by the multicollinearity 
problem. On the other hand, the correlation 
coefficients between different performance variables 
are significantly positive. 
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Table 2. Mean values of firm performance (dependent), and independent variables 
 
Variables Local Private Firms Foreign Firms Government Firms Total Sample 
A. Performance Variables (Mean Numbers) 
1. Tobin-Q 2.17 2.53 2.33 2.33 
2. Market to Book Value Ratio 2.39 2.75 3.34 2.78 
3. Net Value Added to Asset Ratio (number) 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.38 
4. Return on Assets (Percentage) 7.31 9.38 8.45 8.31 
B. Busyness Variables (Mean Numbers) 
1. Board memberships of directors per firm 53.11 52.88 45.29 50.71 
2. Committee memberships of directors per 
firm 
26.24 25.98 22.07 24.91 
3. Number of Total Directorships (1+2) Per 
Firm 
79.35 78.86 67.36 75.62 
C. Governance Variables (Mean Numbers) 
1. Board Size (number) 12.18 10.64 12.78 11.86 
2. Composition of Board (percentage of total board) 
i. Independent Directors 52.75 63.38 57.24 57.51 
ii. Affiliated Directors 17.22 11.31 12.68 13.97 
iii. Outside Directors (i+ii) 69.97 74.69 69.92 71.48 
iv. Executive Directors 20.22 16.49 19.09 18.68 
v. Promoters Non-Executive Directors 9.81 8.82 10.99 9.84 
vi. Inside Directors (iv+v) 30.03 25.31 30.08 28.53 
3. Ownership Structure (percentage of total paid-up capital) 
i. Resident Individual Investors 23.55 19.78 16.94 20.37 
ii. Indian Financial Institutions 13.97 9.14 9.64 11.13 
iii. Government Investors 8.53 7.09 59.92 23.38 
iv. Resident Corporate Bodies 36.69 9.08 7.56 19.13 
v. Foreign Institutional/Individual Investors 8.09 54.74 5.77 22.39 
vi. Promoters & Promoter Group 45.26 69.99 59.93 57.58 
vii. Public Shareholdings 54.67 28.94 40.01 42.03 
4. Debt-equity ratio 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.81 
5. Non-audit fees to total auditor fees ratio 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.17 
D. Firm Level Control Variables (Mean Numbers) 
1. R&D Intensity (percentage) 2.95 3.54 2.44 2.99 
2. Advertisement-intensity (percentage) 2.49 3.15 2.14 2.6 
4. Trade-intensity ratio 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.56 
5. Market-Capitalization (Million Rupees@) 76822.67 73223.89 81177.97 76963.79 
Note: @ The 52-week range of one US dollar in terms of Indian Rupees for the time period between 2 August 
2015 to 1 August 2016 has been between 63.7150 - 68.7887.  http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDINR:CUR 
(Accessed 2 August 2016). 
  
Table 3. Pairwise correlation table of variables 
 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
X1 1 .089 .057 -.041 -.009 .115 -.004 -.005 .005 .001 .001 .000 -.010 -.233** -.112* -.232* -.103* 
X2 .089 1 -.016 .062 .103 .089 .000 -.009 .001 .007 -.004 .004 .007 -.127* -.005 -.116* -.005 
X3 .057 -.016 1 -.082 -.112 -.134 .012 -.003 .005 -.005 -.002 .003 -.001 -.176† .003 .005 .203* 
X4 -.041 .062 -.082 1 .102† -.109† .009 -.009 .006 -.007 -.005 .000 -.007 .021** .142* .052† .193* 
X5 -.009 .103 -.112 .102† 1 -.109 .034 .006 .008 -.007 -.010 -.001 -.002 .011† .010 -.010 .127* 
X6 .115 .089 -.134 -.109† -.109 1 .007 .004 -.013 .009 .003 -.003 .013 -.006 .023† .138* .009 
X7 -.004 .000 .012 .009 .034 .007 1 .000 .004 .012 .011 .009 .006 .008 .013† .012† .003 
X8 -.005 -.009 -.003 -.009 .006 .004 .000 1 .024 -.005 .001 -.002 -.002 .688** .591** .454** .344** 
X9 .005 .001 .005 .006 .008 -.013 .004 .024 1 .002 -.004 -.002 .005 .042 .421** .601** .291** 
X10 .001 .007 -.005 -.007 -.007 .009 .012 -.005 .002 1 .011 .000 -.029 -.042* -.001 -.167* .000 
X11 .001 -.004 -.002 -.005 -.010 .003 .011 .001 -.004 .011 1 -.012 -.053 .121** .112† .003 .006 
X12 .000 .004 .003 .000 -.001 -.003 .009 -.002 -.002 .000 -.012 1 .003 -.142* -.003 -.003 -.119* 
X13 -.010 .007 -.001 -.007 -.002 .013 .006 -.002 .005 -.029 -.053 .003 1 .232** .003 .215* .128* 
Y1 -.233** -.127* -.176† .021** .011† -.006 .008 .688** .042 -.042* .121** -.142* .232** 1 .792** .859** .759** 
Y2 -.112* -.005 .003 .142* .010 .023† .013† .591** .421** -.001 .112† -.003 .003 .792** 1 .787** .719** 
Y3 -.232* -.116* .005 .052† -.010 .138* .012† .454** .601** -.167* .003 -.003 .215* .859** .787** 1 .638** 
Y4 -.103* -.005 .203* .193* .127* .009 .003 .344** .291** .000 .006 -.119* .128* .759** .719** .638** 1 
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. and † p < 0.1 
X1: Median Directorships, X2: Median committee to board size, X3: Board size, X4: Promoter directors proportion, 
X5: Promoters ownership proportion, X6: Independent directors proportion, X7: Foreign ownership proportion, X8: 
Research & development intensity, X9: Advertisement intensity, X10: Non-audit fees to total fees of auditor, X11: Trade 
intensity, X12: Debt-equity ratio, X13: Market-capitalization.  
Y1: Tobin-Q, Y2: Market-to-book value ratio, Y3: Return on assets, Y4: Net Value Added to Asset Ratio 
 
Table 4 highlights the effects of busyness and 
other explanatory variables on TQ, the principal 
performance variable (dependent), for the full 
sample. Similarly, this table explains impacts of the 
busyness variables and other explanatory variables 
on MBVR, NVAAR, and ROA in order to check the 
robustness of the association between board 
busyness and firm performance. The negative 
relationships between median firm-level total 
directorships, on the one hand, and all four 
performance measures, on the other, have been 
found to be significant. Similarly, the intensity of 
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busyness negatively affects firm performance (TQ 
and ROA). The above two results support the agency 
theory argument that the increased board busyness, 
negatively affects firm performance, both, 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The phenomenon 
can be termed quantitative as an increasing number 
of median outside directorships accepted by firm 
directors can make them over-committed and thus 
leave them with relatively less time and other 
resources available to devote to the firm. Similarly, 
the above phenomenon can be termed qualitative 
because an increasing ratio of median committee 
memberships to firm board size indicates that when 
a director joins a committee instead of a general 
board of directors he/she can find his/her 
professional responsibilities more challenging and 
demanding. 
 
Table 4. Effects of busyness, governance, and control variables on firm performance (TQ, MBVR, NVA to 
asset ratio and ROA) 
 
Dependent variables TQ MBVR NVAAR ROA 
Intercept 
1.125 
(1.035) 
-0.026 
(-0.318) 
-0.004 
(-0.156) 
0.008 
(0.577) 
Med-Dir 
-0.713* 
(-1.662) 
-0.252† 
(-1.369) 
-0.102† 
(-1.567) 
-0.113† 
(-1.612) 
Comm-BS 
-0.519† 
(-1.448) 
-0.002 
(-0.038) 
-0.000 
(-0.128) 
-0.076† 
(-1.435) 
BS 
-0.576† 
(-1.595) 
-0.004 
(-0.098) 
0.483* 
(2.112) 
0.439 
(1.267) 
Pr-Ind-Dir 
-0.403 
(-1.257) 
0.122† 
(1.314) 
0.000 
(0.137) 
0.197** 
(8.039) 
Pr-Prom-Dir 
1.202** 
(6.271) 
0.069† 
(1.289) 
0.0981* 
(1.767) 
0.196* 
(2.322) 
Pr-Prom-Own 
0.746* 
(2.325) 
0.041 
(0.332) 
0.064† 
(1.323) 
-0.092 
(-0.978) 
Pr-Forgn-Own 
0.025 
(0.268) 
0.073* 
(1.968) 
-0.004 
(-0.278) 
0.072† 
(1.392) 
D/E ratio 
-0.502† 
(-1.336) 
-0.008 
(-0.266) 
-0.067† 
(-1.383) 
-0.022 
(-0.681) 
NAS ratio 
-0.766* 
(-1.819) 
-0.006 
(-0.207) 
-0.007 
(-0.356) 
-0.007† 
(-1.287) 
R&D-int 
0.561† 
(1.497) 
0.441** 
(6.031) 
0.046† 
(1.287) 
0.054† 
(1.345) 
Advert-int 
0.108 
(0.789) 
0.382** 
(5.044) 
0.054† 
(1.319) 
0.092† 
(1.539) 
Trd-int 
1.109** 
(4.271) 
0.102† 
(1.295) 
0.016 
(0.679) 
0.002 
(0.413) 
MarCap 
0.809** 
(3.671) 
0.031 
(0.301) 
0.114** 
(7.513) 
0.113* 
(2.228) 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.41 
N 3733 3733 3733 3733 
Note: OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1 
TQ: Tobin-Q;  MBVR: Market-to-book value ratio; NVAAR: Net Value Added to Asset Ratio; ROA: Return on assets; 
Med-Dir: Median Directorships; Comm-BS: Median committee to board size; BS: Board size; Pr-Ind-Dir: Independent 
directors proportion; Pr-Prom-Dir: Promoter directors proportion ; Pr-Prom-Own: Promoters ownership proportion;  Pr-
Forgn-Own: Foreign ownership proportion; D/E ratio: Debt-equity ratio; NAS Ratio: Non-audit fees to total fees of 
auditor; R&D-intensity: Research & development intensity;  Advert-intensity: Advertisement intensity;  Trd-intensity: 
Trade intensity;  MarCap: Market-capitalization. 
 
The positive association of both Pr-Prom-Dir 
and Pr-Prom-Own with the firm performance 
variables highlights that investors react positively to 
the promoters’ control over the board and 
ownership of the firm. The coefficient of BS 
negatively affects firm value measured by TQ, 
however, the effect is positive in the case of NVAAR. 
On the one hand, larger boards can be prone to 
unnecessary delays, and complications, for example, 
with respect to planning and operations. On the 
other hand, larger boards lead to enriched board 
resources, which in turn support formulating better 
plans and running operations successfully. The 
positive coefficient of Pr-Ind-Dir shows that as the 
proportion of independent directors increases, the 
firm performance (MBVR and ROA) improves. The 
coefficient of Pr-Forgn-Own affects MBVR and ROA 
positively. Furthermore, the impact of R&D-int, 
Advert-int, Trd-int and MarCap is found to be 
positive in terms of firm performance. However, the 
coefficient of the D/E ratio, which highlights the 
firm’s capital structure, and the NAS ratio negatively 
affect firm performance. 
Table 5 highlights the association between firm 
performance of local private sector firms and board 
busyness. The coefficient of spline-1 turns negative 
and significant at the median directorships at spline-
node-5 and continues to be ever more significant up-
to node 10. The interpretation of the above finding 
is that at the busyness level of five directorships and 
above, corporate directors in local private Indian 
firms may find it difficult to perform the tasks 
entrusted to them efficiently and as a result firm 
value is eroded. Furthermore, the above finding 
contradicts the regulatory provision under the 
Companies Act of India that the “maximum number 
of public companies in which a person can be 
appointed as a director shall not exceed ten” (MCA, 
2013:97). Regarding the intensity of busyness, the 
variable Comm-BS becomes negative and significant 
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once the median number of directorships reaches a 
cut-off point of four, and this trend continues as the 
number of directorships increases further. This 
result implies that at a busyness level of below four, 
it is immaterial whether the majority of directors of 
a firm are only members of other firms’ boards or 
participate on specific committees of such firms; 
however, when a majority of directors of a firm 
increase their committee memberships in other 
firms to four, the directors find it difficult to 
perform tasks requiring specialized skills and/or to 
devote time and effort to the specific committees of 
other firms. For Pr-Prom-Dir, the result indicates 
that as busyness level is increasing from spline-
node-5, investors of a firm start perceiving a higher 
proportion of promoter directors on its board as a 
sign of vital firm-specific information possessed by 
directors, and higher control of promoter directors 
over the firm board ensures that such strategic 
information remain within given corporate group. A 
similar argument holds for Pr-Prom-Own too. Based 
on the above findings of local private sector firms in 
India H
1a
 and H
3 
can be accepted
. 
 
Table 5. Effects of busyness, governance, and control variables on firm performance (measured by TQ) in the 
private sector in India 
 
TQ (dependent variable) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 
Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept 
0.137 
(1.109) 
0.137 
(1.109) 
1.135 
(1.076) 
1.135 
(1.076) 
0.137 
(1.109) 
1.136 
(1.091) 
1.131 
(0.882) 
1.129 
(0.769) 
Spline-1 
-0.621 
(-1.187) 
-0.667 
(-1.272) 
-0.762† 
(-1.616) 
-0.764† 
(-1.639) 
-0.789* 
(-2.249) 
-0.789* 
(-2.291) 
-0.791* 
(-2.309) 
-0.792* 
(-2.321) 
Spline-2 
0.037 
(0.668) 
0.037 
(0.668) 
0.035 
(0.621) 
0.035 
(0.621) 
0.033 
(0.547) 
0.033 
(0.547) 
0.033 
(0.547) 
0.033 
(0.547) 
Comm-BS 
-0.741 
(-1.279) 
-1.008* 
(-2.309) 
-1.008* 
(-2.309) 
-1.112** 
(2.367) 
-1.116** 
(2.549) 
-1.117** 
(2.611) 
-1.119** 
(2.692) 
-1.119** 
(2.692) 
BS 
-0.372 
(-1.121) 
-0.372 
(-1.121) 
-0.372 
(-1.121) 
-0.403 
(-1.167) 
-0.421 
(-1.225) 
-0.508* 
(-1.467) 
-0.509* 
(-1.514) 
-0.528* 
(-1.626) 
Pr-Ind-Dir 
-0.865 
(-1.184) 
-0.881 
(-1.277) 
-1.313* 
(-2.119) 
-1.345* 
(-2.321) 
-1.521** 
(-4.698) 
-1.589** 
(-5.887) 
-1.675** 
(-6.698) 
-1.779** 
(-8.127) 
Pr-Prom-Dir 
0.069 
(0.821) 
0.073 
(0.991) 
0.083† 
(1.291) 
0.084† 
(1.311) 
0.084† 
(1.311) 
0.085† 
(1.345) 
0.085† 
(1.345) 
0.085† 
(1.345) 
Pr-Prom-Own 
0.045 
(0.628) 
0.045 
(0.628) 
0.045 
(0.628) 
.052 
(0.712) 
0.076† 
(1.284) 
0.076† 
(1.284) 
0.076† 
(1.284) 
0.076† 
(1.284) 
Pr-Forgn-Own 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
0.039 
(0.515) 
D/E ratio 
-0.082† 
(-1.423) 
-0.076† 
(-1.322) 
-0.059† 
(-1.301) 
-0.052 
(-0.927) 
-0.052 
(-0.927) 
-0.051 
(-0.865) 
-0.047 
(-0.796) 
-0.047 
(-0.796) 
NAS ratio 
-0.532 
(-1.277) 
-0.532 
(-1.277) 
-0.532 
(-1.277) 
-0.711* 
(-1.723) 
-0.716* 
(-1.819) 
-0.717* 
(-1.882) 
-0.719* 
(-1.914) 
-0.719* 
(-1.914) 
R&D-int 
0.062† 
(1.378) 
0.061† 
(1.356) 
0.059† 
(1.301) 
0.051 
(1.239) 
0.051 
(1.239) 
0.051 
(1.239) 
0.051 
(1.239) 
0.051 
(1.239) 
Advert-int 
0.043† 
(1.201) 
0.043† 
(1.201) 
0.043† 
(1.201) 
0.034 
(0.675) 
0.034 
(0.675) 
0.031 
(0.581) 
0.029 
(0.524) 
0.029 
(0.524) 
Trd-int 
1.101** 
(2.327) 
1.104** 
(2.362) 
1.106** 
(2.362) 
1.109** 
(2.419) 
1.111** 
(2.457) 
1.113** 
(2.484) 
1.116** 
(2.549) 
1.116** 
(2.549) 
MarCap 
0.893* 
(2.009) 
0.893* 
(2.009) 
0.894* 
(2.079) 
0.894* 
(2.079) 
0.894* 
(2.079) 
0.896* 
(2.197) 
0.896* 
(2.197) 
0.898* 
(2.231) 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 
N 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 
Note: OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1 
TQ: Tobin-Q;  Comm-BS: Median committee to board size; BS: Board size; Pr-Ind-Dir: Independent directors 
proportion; Pr-Prom-Dir: Promoter directors proportion ; Pr-Prom-Own: Promoters ownership proportion;  Pr-Forgn-
Own: Foreign ownership proportion; D/E ratio: Debt-equity ratio; NAS Ratio: Non-audit fees to total fees of auditor; 
R&D-intensity: Research & development intensity;  Advert-intensity: Advertisement intensity; Trd-intensity: Trade 
intensity;  MarCap: Market-capitalization. 
 
Table 6 shows that for foreign firms, their 
corporate directors holding multiple directorships 
enhance firm performance. The coefficient of the 
spline-2 variable remains significantly positive at all 
busyness levels, that is, from spline node three to 
ten. This finding is aligned with resource 
dependence theory, as directors serving on multiple 
boards represent their high level of reputational 
capital, which can result in a positive effect on firm 
performance. This result, similar to that obtained in 
the case of local Indian private firms (Table 5), also 
contradicts the wisdom of setting a regulatory limit 
of ten directorships in India (MCA, 2013), albeit in 
the opposite direction. For local Indian private firms, 
the regulatory limit of ten directorships is too big; 
whereas for foreign firms, the results suggest there 
is more scope for directors to join additional boards. 
Regarding the intensity of busyness, Comm/BS is 
insignificant, implying that when directors of a 
foreign firm in India join other firms’ boards it does 
not affect the firm’s performance negatively. The 
above findings support H
2a
.  
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Table 6. Effects of busyness, governance, and control variables on firm performance (measured by TQ) in the 
foreign sector in India 
 
TQ (dependent variable) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept 2.028 (0.676) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
2.126 
(0.831) 
Spline-1 
0.021 
(0.462) 
0.021 
(0.462) 
0.024 
(0.571) 
0.024 
(0.571) 
0.024 
(0.571) 
0.023 
(0.512) 
0.023 
(0.512) 
0.021 
(0.462) 
Spline-2 0.991
† 
(1.376) 
0.982† 
(1.365) 
0.992† 
(1.376) 
1.065* 
(2.119) 
1.071* 
(2.176) 
1.077* 
(2.201) 
1.079* 
(2.243) 
1.081* 
(2.281) 
Comm-BS 0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.071) 
BS 
0.117 
(0.683) 
0.143 
(0.769) 
0.143 
(0.769) 
0.175 
(0.872) 
0.214† 
(1.283) 
0.235† 
(1.297) 
0.235† 
(1.297) 
0.235† 
(1.297) 
Pr-Ind-Dir 0.412
* 
(2.253) 
0.373* 
(2.221) 
0.312† 
(1.339) 
0.294† 
(1.301) 
0.172 
(0.545) 
0.166 
(0.482) 
0.154 
(0.422) 
0.143 
(0.335) 
Pr-Prom-Dir 0.992
† 
(1.371) 
0.992† 
(1.371) 
0.992† 
(1.371) 
0.993† 
(1.382) 
1.013† 
(1.425) 
1.032* 
(1.679) 
1.044* 
(2.021) 
1.045* 
(2.098) 
Pr-Prom-Own -0.005 (-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
-0.005 
(-0.424) 
Pr-Forgn-Own 0.044
† 
(1.282) 
0.044† 
(1.282) 
0.045† 
(1.291) 
0.045† 
(1.291) 
0.048† 
(1.311) 
0.048† 
(1.311) 
0.048† 
(1.311) 
0.049† 
(1.326) 
D/E ratio 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
0.001 
(0.434) 
NAS ratio -0.21
** 
(-2.563) 
-0.21** 
(-2.563) 
-0.19** 
(-2.356) 
-0.19** 
(-2.356) 
-0.16* 
(-2.203) 
-0.16* 
(-2.203) 
-0.15* 
(-2.123) 
-0.15* 
(-2.123) 
R&D-int 1.447
** 
(8.868) 
1.451** 
(8.941) 
1.457** 
(9.627) 
1.463** 
(9.992) 
1.461** 
(9.911) 
1.459** 
(9.867) 
1.459** 
(9.867) 
1.459** 
(9.867) 
Advert-int 
0.032 
(1.221) 
0.031 
(1.165) 
0.029 
(1.123) 
0.029 
(1.123) 
0.029 
(1.123) 
0.028 
(0.823) 
0.028 
(0.823) 
0.027 
(0.535) 
Trd-int 0.000 (-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
0.000 
(-0.054) 
MarCap 1.197
** 
(6.549) 
1.197** 
(6.549) 
1.193** 
(6.447) 
1.192** 
(6.376) 
1.192** 
(6.376) 
1.192** 
(6.376) 
1.191** 
(6.296) 
1.191** 
(6.296) 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 
N 585 585 585 585 585 585 585 585 
Note: OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. TQ: Tobin-Q; Comm-BS: Median committee to board size; BS: Board 
size; Pr-Ind-Dir: Independent directors proportion; Pr-Prom-Dir: Promoter directors proportion ; Pr-Prom-Own: Promoters 
ownership proportion; Pr-Forgn-Own: Foreign ownership proportion; D/E ratio: Debt-equity ratio; NAS Ratio: Non-audit fees to 
total fees of auditor; R&D-intensity: Research & development intensity; Advert-intensity: Advertisement intensity;  Trd-
intensity: Trade intensity; MarCap: Market-capitalization. 
 
Table 7. Effects of busyness, governance, and control variables on firm performance (measured by TQ) in the 
government sector in India 
 
TQ (dependent variable) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept 1.113 
(0.574) 
1.111 
(0.523) 
1.111 
(0.523) 
1.111 
(0.523) 
1.112 
(0.591) 
1.112 
(0.591) 
1.112 
(0.591) 
1.113 
(0.574) 
Spline-1 -0.002 (-0.396) 
-0.003 
(-0.427) 
-0.003 
(-0.427) 
-0.002 
(-0.396) 
-0.003 
(-0.427) 
-0.004 
(-0.487) 
-0.004 
(-0.487) 
-0.004 
(-0.487) 
Spline-2 1.457
** 
(6.443) 
1.461** 
(6.729) 
1.465** 
(7.222) 
1.471** 
(8.443) 
1.471** 
(8.443) 
1.476** 
(9.025) 
1.479** 
(9.443) 
1.481** 
(9.624) 
Comm-BS 
-0.501 
(-1.106) 
-0.501 
(-1.106) 
-0.513 
(-1.233) 
-0.579† 
(-1.867) 
-0.623† 
(-2.028) 
-0.662† 
(-2.089) 
-0.704* 
(-2.192) 
-0.704* 
(-2.192) 
BS -0.147
† 
(-1.335) 
-0.147† 
(-1.335) 
-0.148† 
(-1.387) 
-0.149† 
(-1.427) 
-0.149† 
(-1.427) 
-0.151† 
(-1.503) 
-0.154† 
(-1.589) 
-0.155† 
(-1.621) 
Pr-Ind-Dir 0.069 
(0.899) 
0.071 
(0.924) 
0.071 
(0.924) 
0.071 
(0.924) 
0.073 
(0.934) 
0.075 
(0.954) 
0.076 
(1.112) 
0.076 
(1.112) 
Pr-Prom-Dir 
-0.051 
(-0.683) 
-0.053 
(-0.737) 
-0.051 
(-0.683) 
-0.049 
(-0.627) 
-0.048 
(-0.563) 
-0.051 
(-0.683) 
-0.051 
(-0.683) 
-0.052 
(-0.706) 
Pr-Prom-Own 0.131
† 
(1.298) 
0.131† 
(1.298) 
0.131† 
(1.298) 
0.132† 
(1.309) 
0.132† 
(1.309) 
0.132† 
(1.309) 
0.133† 
(1.321) 
0.133† 
(1.321) 
Pr-Forgn-Own 0.129
† 
(1.287) 
0.129† 
(1.287) 
0.129† 
(1.287) 
0.125 
(1.223) 
0.124 
(1.205) 
0.124 
(1.205) 
0.123 
(1.176) 
0.123 
(1.176) 
D/E ratio -0.623
* 
(-2.043) 
-0.623* 
(-2.043) 
-0.631* 
(-2.087) 
-0.632* 
(-2.098) 
-0.632* 
(-2.098) 
-0.633* 
(-2.126) 
-0.634* 
(-2.143) 
-0.636* 
(-2.157) 
NAS ratio -0.003 (-0.451) 
-0.002 
(-0.379) 
-0.002 
(-0.379) 
-0.001 
(-0.265) 
-0.001 
(-0.265) 
-0.001 
(-0.265) 
-0.001 
(-0.265) 
-0.001 
(-0.265) 
R&D-int 
0.006 
(0.163) 
0.008 
(0.191) 
0.008 
(0.191) 
0.008 
(0.191) 
0.011 
(0.256) 
0.011 
(0.256) 
0.013 
(0.317) 
0.013 
(0.317) 
Advert-int 0.048 (0.642) 
0.051 
(0.719) 
0.051 
(0.719) 
0.048 
(0.642) 
0.048 
(0.642) 
0.048 
(0.642) 
0.049 
(0.681) 
0.049 
(0.681) 
Trd-int 0.077
† 
(1.285) 
0.077† 
(1.285) 
0.077† 
(1.285) 
0.065 
(0.823) 
0.065 
(0.823) 
0.063 
(0.782) 
0.062 
(0.763) 
0.062 
(0.763) 
MarCap 
1.225** 
(4.443) 
1.227** 
(4.591) 
1.227** 
(4.591) 
1.229** 
(4.656) 
1.229** 
(4.656) 
1.231** 
(4.721) 
1.233** 
(4.862) 
1.237** 
(5.112) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 
N 772 772 772 772 772 772 772 772 
Note: OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. TQ: Tobin-Q;  Comm-BS: Median committee to board size; BS: Board 
size; Pr-Ind-Dir: Independent directors proportion; Pr-Prom-Dir: Promoter directors proportion ; Pr-Prom-Own: Promoters 
ownership proportion; Pr-Forgn-Own: Foreign ownership proportion; D/E ratio: Debt-equity ratio; NAS Ratio: Non-audit fees to 
total fees of auditor; R&D-intensity: Research & development intensity; Advert-intensity: Advertisement intensity; Trd-intensity: 
Trade intensity; MarCap: Market-capitalization. 
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Table 7 exhibits that for government firms, 
multiple directorships held by the corporate 
directors increases firm performance. The 
coefficient of the spline-2 variable remains 
significantly positive throughout at all busyness 
levels up to spline-node-10. Perhaps, this is the most 
unexpected result, as, with regard to the busyness of 
corporate directors of government firms, it might be 
expected that proliferation of bureaucracy in the 
public sector of India would suggest directors’ 
busyness is underpinned by the agency theory 
argument more than the resource dependence 
argument, and that firm value would reduce as the 
busyness of directors increases. However, the 
argument that follows in support of the above 
finding is that in a public sector company, directors 
are appointed by a ministry or similar statutory 
body on the basis of merit, and the CEOs have the 
less discretionary power to handpick directors. Once 
again, this finding questions the wisdom of the 
regulatory requirements limiting the number of 
directorships to ten in India (MCA, 2013). The 
coefficient of Comm-BS affects firm value negatively 
at busyness level six and beyond. The increasing 
coefficient of Comm-BS implies that when the 
intensity of busyness increases, there is a negative 
effect on firm value, at the higher level of busyness. 
Based on the above findings H
1b
 is rejected and H
3
 is 
accepted. 
Table 8 highlights the effects of multiple 
directorships, and governance and control variables 
on firm performance firms in the full sample. The 
coefficients of spline-1 and spline-2 affect firm value 
negatively (at spline-node-6 and above) and 
positively (at spline-node-4 and below), respectively. 
In other words, multiple directorships affect a firm 
favourably only up to the level of four directorship 
assignments in other firms. On the other hand, 
multiple directorships affect a firm unfavourably 
when its directors take up six or more directorship 
assignments in other firms. This result highlights 
the interplay of agency, and resource dependence 
theory when studying the relationship between 
multiple directorships and firm value. The 
coefficient of Comm-BS affects firm value negatively 
at a multiple directorship level of six or above. For 
the overall sample H
1
 and H
3
 are true at a relatively 
higher level of busyness, however, H
2
 is valid only at 
lower levels. 
 
Table 8. Effects of busyness, governance, and control variables on firm performance (measured by TQ) for 
the full sample 
 
TQ (dependent variable) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 
Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept 
1.442 
(1.271) 
1.442 
(1.271) 
1.441 
(1.223) 
1.441 
(1.223) 
1.439 
(1.187) 
1.439 
(1.187) 
1.439 
(1.187) 
1.439 
(1.187) 
Spline-1 
-0.342 
(-1.196) 
-0.342 
(-1.196) 
-0.414 
(-1.277) 
-0.512* 
(-2.221) 
-0.739** 
(-4.337) 
-0.752** 
(-4.889) 
-0.786** 
(-5.442) 
-0.814** 
(-6.296) 
Spline-2 
0.221* 
(1.891) 
0.219* 
(1.843) 
0.182 
(1.262) 
0.159 
(1.198) 
0.154 
(1.165) 
0.139 
(1.112) 
0.135 
(0.923) 
0.123 
(0.773) 
Comm-BS 
-0.323 
(-1.167) 
-0.363 
(-1.221) 
-0.422 
(-1.281) 
-0.776** 
(-5.345) 
-0.791** 
(-5.481) 
-0.797** 
(-5.526) 
-0.797** 
(-5.526) 
-0.799** 
(-5.614) 
BS 
-0.303 
(-1.034) 
-0.303 
(-1.034) 
-0.329 
(-1.127) 
-0.421 
(-1.225) 
-0.509† 
(-1.554) 
-0.528† 
(-1.623) 
-0.571* 
(-2.291) 
-0.577* 
(-2.324) 
Pr-Ind-Dir 
-0.363 
(-1.219) 
-0.378 
(-1.243) 
-0.378 
(-1.243) 
-0.403 
(-1.257) 
-0.403 
(-1.257) 
-0.509* 
(-2.212) 
-1.441** 
(-6.698) 
-1.441** 
(-6.698) 
Pr-Prom-Dir 
0.082† 
(1.345) 
0.079† 
(1.323) 
0.076† 
(1.309) 
0.074† 
(1.299) 
0.074† 
(1.299) 
0.072† 
(1.287) 
0.055 
(1.239) 
0.047 
(1.178) 
Pr-Prom-Own 
0.081† 
(1.331) 
0.076† 
(1.309) 
0.073† 
(1.295) 
0.052 
(0.712) 
0.047 
(0.657) 
0.047 
(0.657) 
0.039 
(0.562) 
0.039 
(0.562) 
Pr-Forgn-Own 
0.023 
(0.422) 
0.023 
(0.422) 
0.022 
(0.403) 
0.022 
(0.403) 
0.023 
(0.422) 
0.022 
(0.403) 
0.021 
(0.361) 
0.021 
(0.361) 
D/E ratio 
-0.046 
(-0.765) 
-0.047 
(-0.801) 
-0.051 
(-0.867) 
-0.052 
(-0.927) 
-0.085** 
(-2.824) 
-0.083** 
(-2.622) 
-0.083** 
(-2.622) 
-0.083** 
(-2.622) 
NAS ratio 
-0.703* 
(-1.723) 
-0.711* 
(-1.762) 
-0.714* 
(-1.791) 
-0.715* 
(-1.823) 
-0.716* 
(-1.871) 
-0.717* 
(-1.896) 
-0.718* 
(-1.914) 
-0.718* 
(-1.914) 
R&D-int 
0.083† 
(1.378) 
0.082† 
(1.356) 
0.079† 
(1.321) 
0.078† 
(1.302) 
0.078† 
(1.302) 
0.073† 
(1.287) 
0.073† 
(1.287) 
0.073† 
(1.287) 
Advert-int 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
0.037 
(0.521) 
Trd-int 
0.786** 
(3.346) 
0.862** 
(5.137) 
0.934** 
(6.723) 
0.934** 
(6.723) 
1.008** 
(7.111) 
1.101** 
(7.472) 
1.104** 
(7.723) 
1.104** 
(7.723) 
MarCap 
0.893* 
(2.228) 
0.893* 
(2.228) 
0.894* 
(2.261) 
0.894* 
(2.261) 
0.896* 
(2.291) 
0.896* 
(2.291) 
0.897* 
(2.303) 
0.898* 
(2.322) 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
N 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 
Note: OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1 
TQ: Tobin-Q;  Comm-BS: Median committee to board size; BS: Board size; Pr-Ind-Dir: Independent directors 
proportion; Pr-Prom-Dir: Promoter directors proportion ; Pr-Prom-Own: Promoters ownership proportion;  Pr-Forgn-
Own: Foreign ownership proportion; D/E ratio: Debt-equity ratio; NAS Ratio: Non-audit fees to total fees of auditor; 
R&D-intensity: Research & development intensity;  Advert-intensity: Advertisement intensity; Trd-intensity: Trade 
intensity;  MarCap: Market-capitalization. 
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The results show that for the sub-sample of local 
private firms and for the full sample, the busyness 
of corporate directors adversely affects firm level 
performance. For local private firms and the full 
sample, the board level busyness of directors is 
detrimental to the firm performance even before 
reaching the maximum limit of multiple 
directorships. Furthermore, for the local private 
firms, the above mentioned negative effect starts at 
the busyness cut-off point of five and for the full 
sample the same starts at spline node six. For the 
sub-samples of foreign and government firms, board 
busyness positively affects the firm value 
throughout, whereas, for the full sample, the same 
positive effect does not extend beyond the busyness 
limit of four. With regard to the intensity of 
busyness, the findings show that in the sub-sample 
of local private firms, the negative effect starts at 
the very low level of busyness of four directorships, 
however, for the sub-sample of government firms 
and the full sample, the negative effect of the 
intensity of busyness does not begin before the 
spline node of six. Interestingly, for the full sample 
and each of the three sub-samples, empirical 
findings contradict the limits imposed by the 
regulator. Therefore, ‘one size does not fit all’.  
About theoretical contributions, first, the 
association between the busyness of corporate 
directors and firm performance is problematized 
and analysed through the interplay of two distinct 
and, arguably, conflicting theoretical arguments are 
drawn from the agency, and resource dependence 
theories. Second, the current study highlights the 
importance of factors, such as multiple 
directorships, that determine the independence of 
boards.  
In terms of practical contributions, first, the 
current study is one of very few conducted in the 
setting of an emerging economy like India, and the 
findings of the current paper can be useful to study 
the similar relationship in other emerging markets 
with a corporate governance structure similar to that 
of India. Second, current paper highlight relevance 
of endogenously determined limits of busyness as 
against those imposed exogenously by regulators. 
Furthermore, the busyness limits are not only 
determined for the full-sample but also separately 
for each of the ownership groups, that is, local 
private, foreign and government firms. Therefore, 
the current paper recognises the institutional 
settings and ownership characteristics of firms. 
Third, the current paper also explores the effects of 
promoters’ ownership and control, a peculiar feature 
of Indian corporate settings, on firm performance.   
Nonetheless, the current paper has several 
limitations and further research to overcome them. 
First, the effect of busyness on firm performance 
can be studied by creating multiple categories of 
directors, such as executive, non-executive and 
affiliate directors. Second, alternative measures of 
busyness can be tested in future research. Third, 
measure reputational capital of directors can be 
explored in future studies. Lastly, in the current 
paper private sector firms are comprised of group-
affiliated firms only, however, in the future studies, 
standalone firms can also be studied when analysing 
the effects of busyness on firm performance. 
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